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Nuclear-weapon-material detection via gamma-ray sensing is rou-
tinely applied, for example, in monitoring cross-border traffic. Natu-
ral or deliberate shielding both attenuates and distorts the shape of
the gamma-ray spectra of specific radionuclides, thereby making such
routine applications challenging. We develop a Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test for shielding. A strong advantage of the LM test is that it
only requires fitting a much simpler model that assumes no shielding.
We show that, under the null hypothesis and some mild regularity
conditions and as the detection time increases, LM test statistic for
(composite) shielding is asymptotically Chi-square with the degree of
freedom equal to the presumed number of shielding materials. We also
derive the local power of the LM test. Extensive simulation studies
suggest that the test is robust to the number and nature of the in-
tervening materials, which owes to the fact that common intervening
materials have broadly similar attenuation functions.
1. Introduction. A major homeland security issue concerns monitoring
cross-border traffic to prevent terrorists from smuggling nuclear weapon
materials into the US [Medalia (2009)]. This requires screening cargoes
which may contain illegal radioactive materials, for example, special nu-
clear weapon materials (SNWM). A radioactive material generally gives off
alpha, beta and gamma emissions, and some material also gives off neutrons.
Gamma ray spectra are often used to detect specific nuclear materials, due
to their unique signature and the fact that gamma rays can travel relatively
long distances through most objects. Active detection methods [Fetter et al.
(1990), Moss et al. (2002)] can detect quite small amounts of radioactive ma-
terial, but they are generally not preferable because they can be destructive
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and harmful to humans. Consequently, passive sensing [August and Whit-
lock (2005)] is the prime detection approach.
In many applications (e.g., cargo screening), gamma-ray signature recog-
nition is plagued by the problem of weak signals, owing to (i) relatively
large distances between the radioactive source and the detector (spectrom-
eter) and (ii) natural or deliberate shielding by intervening materials. Fur-
thermore, primary screening uses very low resolution detectors, and higher
resolution NaI detectors are used almost exclusively in secondary vehicle
screening when an alert is generated in primary screening. Shielding not only
attenuates the signal but it also distorts the overall shape of the gamma ray
spectrum, as the strength of attenuation is specific to the energy (level) of
the gamma ray and increases exponentially with the thickness of the inter-
vening material. Since the nature and the thickness of the shielding materials
are generally unknown, shielding makes the problem of nuclide detection via
gamma-ray signature recognition challenging.
In the case of strong unshielded sources or long averaging times, radionu-
clide detection can be carried out by peak finding methods [Jarman et al.
(2003)] and the library least-squares approach (LLS) [Marshall and Zum-
berge (1989), Gardner and Xu (2009)]. The latter approach is based on the
principle that the pulse height (gamma ray) spectrum recorded by a detector
(the photon counts as a function of photon energy) is, on average, equal to
the weighted sum of the detector response functions (DRF) to the gamma
rays reaching the detector, plus that of the background radiation, where the
weights are the intensities of the gamma rays. Consequently, the problem of
deducing which radionuclides are in the source may, in principle, be reduced
to a regression problem. Assuming no shielding, the relative intensities of
the gamma rays emitted by a radionuclide of interest are known so that
their detector response functions can be combined into one single detector
response function unique to the radionuclide, which makes the regression
problem more manageable.
In the general case of shielding, all gamma rays emitted by radionuclides
of interest and all the ways in which they may be attenuated or modi-
fied must be included in the regression model. Their DRFs may be modeled
semiparametrically [Mitchell, Sanger and Marlow (1989)] or by Monte Carlo
techniques as used in the Monte Carlo N-Particle code (MCNP) [Cashwell,
Everett and Rechard (1957)] and GEometry ANd Tracking (GEANT) [Al-
lison et al. (2006)]. The library of all relevant DRFs is then quite large, in-
troducing multicollinearity and increasing the number of parameters, which
renders this approach not practical. This problem can be solved by (i) group-
ing the detector response functions nuclide by nuclide, (ii) noting that the
coefficients are all positive for a group if the corresponding nuclide is present,
and (iii) recognizing that only a few radionuclides may be present in the
source so that the regression model is sparse, that is, most of the regression
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coefficients are zero; see Chan et al. (2012), Bai et al. (2011) and Kump
et al. (2012).
In principle, gamma ray recognition may be enhanced by incorporating
the physical laws of shielding. However, given the unknown nature of the
shielding material(s) of unknown thickness, a model-based approach would
require estimating a rather complex and nonlinearly parameterized model.
Here, we develop a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for shielding by known
intervening materials which only requires fitting the much simpler model
under the null hypothesis of no shielding. Our approach assumes that the
mean background radiation (due to naturally occurring radioactive sources,
e.g., cosmic rays, granite, etc.) is known and we are interested in detecting
the presence of specific radionuclides, a relatively easy task, in the absence of
shielding. Thus, the critical problem is to test for the presence of shielding,
under the framework of screening for specific radionuclides embedded in
background radiation. Solving this problem is pertinent to achieving the
real goal of detecting the known sources, as detecting shielding would trigger
human inspection. We show that the LM test statistic has an asymptotic
Chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis of no shielding, with the
degree of freedom equal to the presumed number of shielding materials. The
attenuation patterns of commonly used intervening materials (e.g., carbon,
lead, concrete and water) are broadly similar. It turns out that this broad
similarity results in the pleasant surprising consequence that the power of
the LM test appears to be robust to the nature and number of common
intervening materials, as suggested by our simulation results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model for
the pulse height spectrum under shielding. In Section 3 we derive the La-
grange multiplier test and its asymptotic null distribution. The asymptotic
power of the test is obtained in Section 4. Extensive simulations with shield-
ing by simple or composite intervening materials are reported in Section 5.
Our approach focuses on attenuation of the gamma rays by intervening ma-
terials but ignores the secondary effects of down scattering of the gamma-ray
spectra due to Compton scattering of the gamma rays outside the detector,
which introduces errors in the DRFs by changing the relative contributions
of each of the emissions from the radionuclide and by changing the shape
and intensity of the background radiation. Indeed, background radiation
generally varies over time, for example, it is subject to vehicle suppression
in cargo screening [Lo Presti et al. (2006)]. See Burr and Hamada (2009)
for a review on the difficulties and challenges of isotope identification us-
ing fielded NaI detectors. Furthermore, DRF is detector-specific and may
be unstable over time. In Section 6 we perform a sensitivity analysis of the
proposed method against errors in the DRFs and the background radiation.
We conclude in Section 7 by pointing out some future research necessary
before field deployment of the proposed methods.
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It is desirable to test the proposed method with real data. However, to
access real data from any US port of entry, red tape has to be overcome and
the process has proved to be much harder than expected due to potential
national security issues. The data used in the paper are semi-real in the
sense that the background was based on a real background and isotope
spectra were synthetically superimposed on the background according to
the standard and data published by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
2. A Poisson regression model for shielding. Before presenting the sta-
tistical model for shielding, we outline the physics underlying shielding of
radionuclides; see Bryan (2008), Maher and Wikibooks Contributors (2008),
Smith and Lucas (2002) and Cantone and Hoeschen (2011) for further de-
tails. Each radionuclide emits a unique finite discrete set of gamma rays, that
is, the probability distribution of the emitted photon energy is of a discrete
type and unique to the radionuclide. For example, Iodine-131 (131I) emits
five monoenergetic gamma rays at energies 80.185 kiloelectron volt (keV),
284.31 keV, 364.489 keV, 636.99 keV and 722.911 keV, excluding those with
branching ratio (probability of emission) less than 0.5%. The presence of a
pure intervening material reduces the intensity of a monoenergetic gamma
ray exponentially with the mass thickness of the intervening material (the
product of the thickness and density of the material), with a multiplicative
factor known as the attenuation coefficient, which is specific to the energy
of the gamma ray and the intervening material.
A monoenergetic gamma ray that reaches the detector leads to scattering
inside the detector, resulting in a distribution of photons. The correspond-
ing mean photon count as a function of the photon energy is known as the
detector response function, which is unique to the energy level of the gamma
ray entering into the detector. The spectrum includes a response from en-
ergies other than that of the photon being detected due to interactions of
the photon inside the detector. The upper curves in the bottom panel in
Figure 1 display the detector response function (on the logarithmic scale) of
the five monoenergetic gamma rays emitted by 131I.
We now present the statistical model for the pulse height spectrum recorded
in a detector. Let Yi represent the photon count at the ith energy channel
of a spectrometer, where i= 1, . . . ,N . [For example, N = 1024 channels over
the energy range up to 3 megaelectron volt (MeV).] The photon counts are
modeled as independent Poisson random variables, with the mean of Yi given
by
µi =
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
Sijlajl,
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Fig. 1. Attenuated subspectra of monoenergetic gamma emissions for 131I and 239Pu, on
the logarithmic scale, whose branching ratios (probabilities of emission) are greater than
0.5%, under lead shielding with x= 0 (i.e., no shielding, upper curves) and x= 10 (lower
curves).
where {Sijl, i = 1, . . . ,N} is the detector response function to the lth mo-
noenergetic gamma ray emitted by the jth nuclide, l= 1, . . . , pj, j = 1, . . . , J .
For simplicity, background radiation is included in the library of radionu-
clides postulated to be in the source, and it is indexed by J , so pJ = 1. Here,
ajl denotes the (relative) intensity of the lth monoenergetic gamma ray of
the jth nuclide.
Suppose that a slab of known intervening material of a pure type, for
example, lead, of thickness t and density ρ stands perpendicular to the path
between a radioactive source and the spectrometer. The attenuation of the
gamma ray depends on its energy and the intervening material. Let Ij0
be the initial emission intensity of the jth nuclei. The intervening material
then attenuates the intensity of its lth monoenergetic gamma ray to Ijl =
Ij0 × e−cjl×x, where cjl (cm2/g) is the mass attenuation coefficient (see the
NIST websites2), and x (g/cm2) is the mass thickness, that is, the product
2http://physics.nist.gov/PhysRefData/XrayMassCoef/tab4.html.
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of the density ρ and thickness t of the intervening material. The attenuation
formula can be extended to the case of multiple intervening materials (e.g.,
carbon and lead), say, M of them each of mass thickness xm, m= 1, . . . ,M :
Ijl = Ij0× e−
∑M
j=1 cjlm×xm,
where cjlm is the mass attenuation coefficient, due to the mth intervening
material, for the lth monoenergetic gamma ray emitted by the jth nuclide.
Here, we have omitted possible down scattering of the gamma spectra by
shielding materials of low atomic number; see Section 7.
Consequently, in the presence of M known intervening materials of mass
thickness xm,m= 1, . . . ,M , the photon counts over the N energy bins, Y=
(Y1, . . . , YN )
⊤, are modeled as jointly independent Poisson random variables
with the marginal distribution given by
Yi ∼ Poisson
(
µi =
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
Sijlajl
)
,
where
ajl = bjτ exp
(
−
M∑
m=1
cjlmxm
)
,
bj is the initial (unshielded) intensity of the jth nuclide per unit time, and
τ is the detection time which, for the moment, is fixed. The background
radiation (listed as the Jth “nuclide” in the library) is not shielded, hence,
cJ1m ≡ 0, for all m= 1, . . . ,M . Note the number of energy bins, N , is gen-
erally fixed. However, the detection time can be increased without bound.
So, the asymptotic properties of the proposed method will be developed in
the framework of fixed N but increasing τ .
3. The Lagrange multiplier test. We consider the problem of testing for
shielding of a radioactive source that possibly comprises a finite number of
known radionuclides by M known intervening materials of unknown mass
thickness.The null hypothesis of no shielding is
H0 : x1 = x2 = · · ·= xM = 0,
that is, x= (x1, . . . , xM )
⊤ = 0, whereas the alternative hypothesis of shield-
ing is
H1 : at least one of xm > 0, m= 1,2, . . . ,M.
A test for shielding may proceed via a likelihood ratio test which requires fit-
ting the unshielded model under the null hypothesis and the general, shielded
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model. The fitting of the latter model is quite complex, owing to the nonlin-
ear attenuation function. Thus, it is desirable to develop a test that does not
require estimating the general model. Intuitively, under the null hypothesis,
the constrained maximum likelihood estimator with x = 0 should be close
to the unconstrained maximum likelihood estimator, but otherwise they di-
verge from each other. Hence, under the null (alternative) hypothesis, the
partial derivative of the log-likelihood w.r.t. x, evaluated at the constrained
estimator, should be close to (diverge from) the zero vector. The Lagrange
multiplier test quantifies the evidence against the null hypothesis in terms
of some quadratic form of the preceding partial derivative that is designed
to be asymptotically χ2-distributed under the null hypothesis.
We now elaborate the Lagrange multiplier (score) test. First, we derive the
score, the Hessian matrix and the Fisher information. Write
φ= (x1, x2, . . . , xM , b1, b2, . . . , bJ)
⊤ = (x⊤,b⊤)⊤, where x= (x1, . . . , xM )⊤ and
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bJ)
⊤. Let uijl = Sijlbj exp(−
∑M
m=1 cjlmxm), tijl =
Sijl exp(−
∑M
m=1 cjlmxm) and Ui =
∑J
j=1
∑pj
l=1 uijl. Note that the attenu-
ation coefficients cjlm are known for specified intervening materials. The log
likelihood function is given by
L(φ;Y) =−τ
N∑
i=1
Ui +
N∑
i=1
Yi log(τUi)−
N∑
i=1
log(Yi!).
The score vector is given by Uτ (φ) =∇L(φ;Y) = [U1,τU2,τ ], where
U1,τ =
(
∂L(φ;Y)
∂xm′
,m′ = 1, . . . ,M
)⊤
and
U2,τ =
(
∂L(φ;Y)
∂bk
, k = 1, . . . , J
)⊤
,
with
∂L(φ;Y)
∂xm′
= τ
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′
−
N∑
i=1
YiU
−1
i
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′ , m
′ = 1, . . . ,M
and
∂L(φ;Y)
∂bk
=−τ
N∑
i=1
pk∑
l=1
tikl
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+
N∑
i=1
YiU
−1
i
pk∑
l=1
tikl, k = 1, . . . , J.
The second derivatives equal
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′′ ∂xm′
=−τ
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′cjlm′′
+
N∑
i=1
Yi
{
U−1i
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′cjlm′′
−U−2i
(
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′
)
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′′
}
for m′,m′′ = 1, . . . ,M ,
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′ ∂bk
= τ
N∑
i=1
pk∑
l=1
tiklcklm′
+
N∑
i=1
Yi
{
U−2i
(
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′
)
pk∑
l=1
tikl −U−1i
pk∑
l=1
tiklcklm′
}
for m′ = 1, . . . ,M and k = 1, . . . , J , and
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂bh ∂bk
=−
N∑
i=1
YiU
−2
i
(
pk∑
l=1
tikl
)(
ph∑
l=1
tihl
)
for k,h= 1, . . . , J .
Let
Fτ (φ) =−∇2L(φ;Y) =
[F11 F12
F21 F22
]
be partitioned according to x and b, where
F11 =
(
− ∂
2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′′ ∂xm′
)
, F12 =
(
−∂
2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′ ∂bk
)
, F22 =
(
−∂
2L(φ;Y)
∂bh ∂bk
)
and F21 =F⊤21.
Consequently, the Fisher information matrix equals
I =
[I11 I12
I21 I22
]
= τ
[
I11 I12
I21 I22
]
= τI,
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where the arguments m′,m′′ below range from 1, . . . ,M and k,h= 1, . . . , J ,
I11 =
[
E
(
−1
τ
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′′ ∂xm′
)]
=
[
N∑
i=1
U−1i
(
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′
)(
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′′
)]
,
I⊤21 = I12 =
[
E
(
−1
τ
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂xm′ ∂bk
)]
=
[
−
N∑
i=1
U−1i
(
J∑
j=1
pj∑
l=1
uijlcjlm′
)(
pk∑
l=1
tikl
)]
and
I22 =
[
E
(
−1
τ
∂2L(φ;Y)
∂bh ∂bk
)]
=
[
N∑
i=1
U−1i
(
pk∑
l=1
tikl
)(
ph∑
l=1
tihl
)]
.
Let U1,τ (φ˜;Y) be an M -dimensional column vector with its mth ele-
ment equal to ∂L(φ˜;Y)
∂xm
. Let φ˜= (0⊤, b˜⊤)⊤ = (0, . . . ,0, b˜1, . . . b˜J)⊤ be the con-
strained maximum likelihood estimator of φ under the null hypothesis. Note
that b˜ can be computed via the EM algorithm. Let I11 be the (1,1) block
of the inverse of the Fisher information matrix I . The Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test statistic equals
ξLM =
1
τ
U1,τ (φ˜;Y)⊤I11(φ˜)U1,τ (φ˜;Y)
=
1
τ
U1,τ (φ˜;Y)⊤{I11(φ˜)− I12(φ˜)I−122 (φ˜)I21(φ˜)}
−1U1,τ (φ˜;Y).
Below we show that the LM test statistic is asymptotically χ2 distributed
and that the classical result on the asymptotic equivalence between the
LM test, the likelihood ratio test and the Wald test holds, under general
regularity conditions. Recall the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic equals
ξLR = 2{L(φˆ)−L(φ˜)},
where φˆ = (xˆ⊤, bˆ⊤)⊤ denotes the unconstrained ML estimator under the
general hypothesis, and the Wald test statistic equals
ξW =
√
τ xˆ⊤{I11(φˆ)}−1√τ xˆ
= τ xˆ⊤{I11(φˆ)− I12(φˆ)I−122 (φˆ)I21(φˆ)}xˆ.
The following assumption is required for the asymptotic equivalence of
the preceding tests under the null hypothesis:
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(A1) The true mean unshielded spectrum is a positive function, that is,∑J
j=1 bjSij• > 0 for every energy channel i= 1, . . . ,N , where Sij• =
∑pj
l=1Sijl.
Denote the partial derivatives of the mean spectrum w.r.t. x and b, evalu-
ated at x= 0 and at the true b, by
vq =
(
−
J∑
j=1
bj
pj∑
l=1
Sijlcjlq, i= 1, . . . ,N
)⊤
for q = 1, . . . ,M and
vq+M = (Siq•, i= 1, . . . ,N)⊤
for q = 1, . . . , J . Then the M + J v’s are linearly independent.
Note that Ui is the mean of Yi at energy channel i. Under the null hypothe-
sis of no shielding, Ui =
∑J
j=1 bjSij•, so (A1) states that the mean unshielded
gamma-ray spectrum is a positive function. As a function of i, Sij• is the
overall DRF for the jth nuclide in the source, while −∑Jj=1 bj∑pjl=1 Sijlcjlq is
the instantaneous reduction rate in the mean unshielded gamma-ray spec-
trum per unit mass thickness of the qth intervening material, evaluated
under the hypothesis of no shielding. The linear independence assump-
tion in (A1) thus formalizes the requirements that distinct radionuclides
have unique gamma-ray signatures and distinct intervening materials admit
unique attenuation patterns.
Theorem 3.1. Assuming (A1) and as the detection time τ →∞, the
LM test statistic, the Wald test statistic and the likelihood ratio test statistic
all have asymptotic χ2M distributions under H0: x= 0.
We defer the proofs of all theoretical results to the supplemental article
Chan et al. (2013). Arguably, (A1) is a mild assumption even though the
second part fails if the attenuation functions (the attenuation coefficient as
a function of the energy of the gamma ray) of the M intervening materials
are linearly dependent. Indeed, M intervening materials with broadly sim-
ilar attenuation functions may be practically approximated by one of the
intervening materials with a modified mass thickness. Below, we illustrate
that common intervening materials have broadly similar attenuation func-
tions. Extensive simulation results reported below suggest that the LM test
is robust to the nature and the number of intervening materials.
4. Local power of the LM test. In this section we derive the local power
of the Lagrange multiplier test, the likelihood ratio test and the Wald test
for testing
H0 :φ=φ0
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versus
H1,τ :φ=φ0 +
h√
τ
,
where h = (h⊤1 ,h
⊤
2 )
⊤, with the vector partition being similar to that of
φ. The following result shows that the tests reject a fixed alternative with
probability approaching 1 as τ →∞.
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1) holds. Then as τ →∞, the Lagrange mul-
tiplier test statistic, the likelihood ratio test statistic and the Wald test statis-
tic have noncentral χ2M distributions with the noncentral parameter equal to
h
⊤
1 (I11 − I12I−122 I21)h1 under H1,τ :φ=φ0 + h√τ , where h= (h⊤1 ,h⊤2 )⊤.
5. Simulation studies. The modeled detector characteristics are those of
a 3 × 3 inch cylindrical NaI detector whose spectral response is degraded
to a resolution at the Cesium 662 keV peak of 80 keV full width half max-
imum (FWHM) of the peak; consequently, the resolution is smaller at low
energies, similar to real measurements. The resolution of the detector is
degraded from that of a standard NaI detector to better approximate the
response of a larger detector or different scintillation material that may
be more appropriate for a drive through a portal system. The unshielded
DRFs are constructed by assuming each source to be small and pure, placed
at an arbitrary distance from the flat face of the detector with no materials
intervening between the source and detector. This ignores the effects of at-
tenuation and matrix effects in the source, but allows one to concentrate on
identification in situations with poor detector resolution. The mean of the
background signal used for the simulation is based upon a long-duration,
measured background using a NaI detector at the US Military Academy
Accelerator facility. This background is adjusted to include radiation from
terrestrial sources pertaining to the 238U decay chain (e.g., 214Pb, 214Bi,
208Tl) that are degraded to the same resolution as the modeled detector;
see Mitchell, Borgardt and Kouzes (2009). The data are further adjusted
so that the variability of the counts about the long-term mean is consis-
tent with a short duration measurement (∼1 minute). The simulation of the
possibly shielded data included this background and further assumed that
there are two radionuclides in the source, namely, 131I and 239Pu, whose
signatures are simulated as described above. 239Pu is chosen because it is
the primary fissile isotope used for the production of nuclear weapons and
the emissions from 239Pu are quite weak and easily attenuated since many
of the lines are of relatively low energy. 131I is chosen because it is fairly
common (and thus may not trigger a more extensive search) and has low
energy emission lines that might be used to intentionally mask the signature
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from 239Pu. This scenario represents a possible method to hide the transport
of 239Pu. The response of the detector is calculated for each emission line
for each of the radionuclides separately. These detector response functions
will also be referred to as the subspectra for each of the nuclei. The de-
tector response includes such phenomena as photoelectric absorption, pair
production, Compton scattering, backscattered photons, escape peaks and
detector efficiency. Each of the subspectra is calculated in proportion to the
branching ratios of the emission lines. Thus, in the absence of shielding, the
mean total response for a given radionuclide is obtained by multiplying all
of the constituent subspectra by the same constant and adding the resultant
spectra. Notice that all the subspectra of 239Pu are under 300 keV and so
are some subspectra of 131I.
Four common intervening materials, namely, carbon, concrete, lead and
water are of interest. A plot of the mass attenuation coefficients (on log
scale) against the energy of the monoenergetic gamma ray, under water,
concrete, carbon and lead shielding for the two radionuclides 131I and 239Pu
are presented in Figure 2. (The mass attenuation coefficients are obtained
by spline interpolation based on the tables of mass attenuation coefficients
posted on the NIST website.3) The curves of mass attenuation coefficients
for carbon, water and concrete shielding are quite similar. Lead has higher
attenuation than the other three materials, at any energy level of the photon,
but it also takes a broadly similar attenuation pattern.
Simple intervening material. We first consider the case of a single inter-
vening material, in which case simulation is done as follows:
1. Let b1 = 1 be the coefficient of
131I, b2 = 0.15 the coefficient of
239Pu,
and b3 = 1 that of the background.
2. Determine c1l and c2l (cm
2/g), where c1l and c2l are the mass attenu-
ation coefficients under the specified intervening material for each monoen-
ergetic gamma ray of 131I and 239Pu in the library. Note the background is
not attenuated by the shielding material so c31 = 0.
3. Calculate a1l = b1τ exp(−c1l × x) and a2l = b2τ exp(−c2l × x) for each
x, respectively, where τ = 1.
4. Simulate Yi as independent Poisson random variables with mean∑J
j=1
∑pj
l=1Sijlajl. Note J = 3 since we only have
131I, 239Pu and back-
ground.
The parameter x ranges from 0 to 30 (g/cm2).
3http://physics.nist.gov/PhysRefData/XrayMassCoef/ , with the path for water
shielding: ComTab/water.html; concrete shielding: ComTab/concrete.html; carbon shield-
ing: ElemTab/z06.html; lead shielding: ComTab/glass.html.
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Fig. 2. 131I and 239Pu mass attenuation coefficients, with vertical lines corresponding to
the peak energy of each subspectrum of 239Pu and vertical dot-dashed lines corresponding
to the peak energy of each subspectrum of 131I.
Figure 1 shows, on the logarithmic scale, the attenuation of the mean
subspectra of monoenergetic gamma emissions for 131I and 239Pu whose
branching ratios are greater than 0.5%, contrasting the case under lead
shielding with x= 10 versus no shielding. In particular, the upper curve in
each sub-figure there is the detector response function (on the logarithmic
scale) to the monoenergetic gamma emission from the nuclide. Figure 3
shows those under carbon shielding.
A sample of simulated signals is presented in Figure 4 per intervening ma-
terial. Empirical power and size of both tests are based on 2000 replications,
with the empirical size checked against the nominal significance level of 0.05.
The LM test statistics were computed with the constrained ML estimators
obtained via the EM algorithm with the convergence criterion of the relative
maximum change in the L1 norm of the parameter estimate being less than
10−9, in all reported results; see the supplemental article Chan et al. (2013).
We first consider the case of carbon shielding. In practice, the nature of
the intervening material is unknown. So we perform the LM test first assum-
ing the intervening material is carbon and then do the same test assuming
one of three other misspecified intervening materials, namely, concrete, lead
and water. The derived asymptotic χ2 distribution for the LM test allows
us to asymptotically calibrate the test, for example, by computing the ap-
proximate p-value based on the χ2 distribution. Moreover, that the limiting
distribution is identical regardless of the true composition of the sources
(true b value) under the null hypothesis justifies using the bootstrap for
calibrating the LM test, which may be more accurate for low signal-to-noise
cases.
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Fig. 3. Attenuated subspectra of monoenergetic gamma emissions for 131I and 239Pu, on
the logarithmic scale, whose branching ratios are greater than 0.5%, under carbon shielding
with x= 0 (i.e., no shielding, upper curves) and x= 10 (lower curves).
The empirical sizes of the LM test for various settings and under the null
hypothesis that x= 0 at a level of 0.05 are presented in Table 1. All sizes are
close to the nominal size of the test. An examination of quantile–quantile
(q–q) plots (unreported) of the LM test statistic against the theoretical Chi-
square distribution with one degree of freedom confirms the asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. Note that the detection time is τ = 1 in all simulations,
even though the theoretical results are derived under the assumption that
τ →∞. This suggests that the results apply even for short times τ .
The empirical power curves for the nominal 0.05 LM test for attenuation
due to carbon, water, concrete and lead are shown in Figure 5 when car-
bon is the true intervening material (top left), when concrete is the true
intervening material (top right), when water is the true intervening material
(bottom right), and when lead is the true intervening material (bottom left
plot). Each plot gives power curves for x ranging from 0 to 0.05 when the
LM test is administered at the nominal 0.05 significance level. All power
curves increase with increasing mass thickness, because greater mass thick-
ness entails stronger shielding, resulting in higher power. The power curves
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Fig. 4. Simulated signals under shielding where the mass thickness x is in g/cm2.
for carbon, water and concrete shielding are of broadly similar shape. How-
ever, the power curve for detecting lead shielding has a different shape, as
it approaches 100% power rather quickly. The shape difference in the power
curves is due to the much stronger lead attenuation function that has a
somewhat different shape; see Figure 2. We notice that the empirical power
curves are almost identical for different combinations of true and presumed
intervening materials, although the power is slightly decreased if the inter-
vention material is misspecified. In other words, the test is robust to the
nature of the intervening material, which likely owes to the fact that the
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Table 1
Empirical size of the LM test for shielding of Poisson signals from 131I, 0.15 239Pu and
background, for each of 4 intervening materials
Test Carbon Concrete Lead Water
LM 0.046 0.044 0.046 0.045
attenuation functions of these four intervening materials have rather similar
shapes.
Composite intervening materials. Next, we consider the case of two in-
tervening materials. There are six cases: carbon–lead shielding, concrete–
lead shielding, water–lead shielding, water–carbon shielding, water–concrete
shielding and concrete–carbon shielding. The data simulation scheme is sim-
ilar to the case of the simple intervening material, with appropriate modifi-
cations as follows:
1. Determine c1lm and c2lm, where c1lm and c2lm are the mass atten-
uation coefficients under the mth, m = 1,2 intervening material for each
monoenergetic gamma emission of 131I and 239Pu.
2. Find the mass thickness such that the empirical power is approximately
50% at the nominal 5% LM test for each intervening material alone. For
each combination of two shielding materials, let xM denote the vector of
their mass thickness so determined. We vary the vector of mass thickness as
a multiple of xM , with the multiple being 0 to 1 with increment by 1/19, in
total 20 of them.
3. Calculate a1l = b1τ exp(−
∑2
m=1 c1lm × xm) and a2l = b2τ ×
exp(−∑2m=1 c2lm × xm) for each xm,m= 1,2, respectively, and τ = 1.
4. Simulate Yi as independent Poisson random variables with mean∑J
j=1
∑pj
l=1Sijlajl. Note J = 3 since we only have
131I, 239Pu and back-
ground.
We performed the LM test for shielding by the two true intervening ma-
terials, but of unknown mass thickness. Then we repeated the LM test as-
suming simple shielding by one of the two shielding materials. The empirical
sizes of the LM test for composite shielding by known intervening materials
at the nominal level of 0.05 are presented in Table 2. They are close to the
nominal size of the test, which is 0.05. In comparison, the empirical size is
0.046 for testing for simple shielding by lead.
Figure 6 together with Figure 7 contrast the empirical power of the test
for composite shielding by known intervening materials with those of tests
for simple shielding by possibly misspecified materials. These figures suggest
that, somewhat paradoxically, the LM test for simple shielding may be more
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Fig. 5. Empirical power curves when the true intervening material is carbon (top left),
concrete (top right), water (bottom right) and lead (bottom left) for the LM test with x
ranging from 0 to 0.05 g/cm2. The horizontal dashed lines show the 0.05 nominal level.
The power curves for testing for attenuation by carbon (concrete, lead, water) are drawn
as red dashed (green dotted, black solid, blue dot-dashed) lines and nearly coincide in most
cases.
powerful than the LM test for composite shielding by known intervening
materials, even for tests for simple shielding by a misspecified material.
Below, we show that this phenomenon arises from the strong collinearity
between the attenuation functions of commonly used intervening materi-
als. Physically, the mass attenuation functions of intervening materials are
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Table 2
Empirical sizes for the LM test when the Poisson signals from 131I, 0.15 239Pu and
background are shielded by various combinations of intervening materials
Test Carbon–Lead Concrete–Lead Water–Lead Water–Carbon
Water–
Concrete
Concrete–
Carbon
LM 0.050 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.050
generally decreasing functions of the photon energy, so they tend to be pos-
itively correlated. Hence, a nonphysical mass attenuation function is used
for illustrating the problem of collinearity. For this purpose, we make up an
artificial, nonphysical material whose mass attenuation function is “uncorre-
lated” with those of the intervening materials considered so far. We set the
mass attenuation function of the artificial material to be exp(sin(En)), where
En is the energy level of the photon. The matrix of scatter plots between the
mass attenuation functions of the artificial material together with the other
four intervening materials is shown in Figure 8, which displays strong posi-
tive correlations among the attenuation functions of carbon, concrete, water
and lead. However, there appears to be no relationship between the mass
attenuation function of the artificial material and those of the other four
materials. We then replicate the simulation experiment with signals simu-
lated from 131I, 0.15239Pu and background, that are shielded by the artificial
material and carbon, while we test for shielding by (i) the artificial material
Fig. 6. Empirical power when the true intervening materials are carbon and lead (left),
water and carbon (middle) and concrete and carbon (right). The power curves for testing
for simple shielding by carbon are drawn as green dashed lines, those of testing for simple
shielding by lead as blue longdash lines, and those for testing for composite shielding by
known materials as red solid lines.
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Fig. 7. Empirical power when the true intervening materials are concrete and lead (left),
water and lead (middle) and water and concrete (right). The power curves for testing for
simple shielding by lead are drawn as blue dashed lines, and those for testing for composite
shielding by known materials as red solid lines.
and carbon, and (ii) by one of the 5 possible intervening materials (carbon,
lead, water, concrete and the artificial material) alone. The mass thick-
nesses of the true composite intervening materials are determined as before,
with the maximum mass thickness of the artificial material being 0.005. Fig-
ure 9 displays the empirical powers of these tests based on 2000 replications,
which now reveals that the test for shielding with the correct specification of
the composite intervening materials (artificial-material–carbon) has higher
power than any test for shielding by a single intervening material.
Multicollinearity can be regarded as a form of ill-conditioning in the co-
variance matrix of the covariate. The condition number, which is defined as
the square root of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the smallest eigen-
value of the covariance matrix, is often used to diagnose multicollinearity.
A matrix with a high condition number (e.g., >30) indicates the presence
of ill-conditioning. The severity of the multicollinearity increases with the
condition number. The condition number of the Fisher information ma-
trix, I11(φ˜)− I12(φ˜)I−122 (φ˜)I21(φ˜), for lead (mass thickness: 9.47 × 10−4)
and carbon (mass thickness: 2.61 × 10−2) shielding is 185.8, while that of
the artificial-material (mass thickness: 2.37×10−3) and carbon (mass thick-
ness: 2.61 × 10−2) shielding is 12.88. This provides further evidence that
the counterintuitive phenomenon arises from strong collinearity between the
mass attenuation functions of commonly used intervening materials.
6. Sensitivity analysis. In order to assess the impacts of errors in the
detector response functions (DRF) and background radiation on the pro-
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Fig. 8. Scatter plot of the mass attenuation functions of carbon, concrete, water, lead
and the artificial material.
posed methods, we repeat the simulation study on the empirical power of
the LM test for shielding of the source (131I and 239Pu) by carbon, with
a similar setup as in the first simulation study in Section 4, but now with
errors added to the DRFs and background radiation. To mimic systematic
errors, we generate data with Sijl replaced by exp(mijl) × Sijl, where, as
functions of i, {mijl, i = 1, . . . ,N} are jointly independent integrated ran-
dom walks. Specifically, mi−2,j,l− 2mi−1,j,l+mi,j,l = cηi, i=N,N − 1, . . . ,1,
with the boundary conditions that mN+1,j,l =mN+2,j,l = 0, where c > 0 is
some scaling factor to make a certain signal to noise ratio and the η’s are
independent standard normal variables. The integrated random walks are
initiated from the high end of the spectrum to mimic the situation that sys-
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Fig. 9. Empirical power curves when the true intervening materials are lead and carbon
(left) and artificial material and carbon (right). In both cases, the empirical power curves
of testing for simple shielding are almost the same, regardless of which intervening material
is assumed in the test.
tematic errors are largest in magnitude over the low end of the spectrum. In
particular, this approach can account for errors due to neglecting Compton
scattering by intervening materials, the modeling of which is complex, as it
depends on the unknown geometric configuration encompassing the source,
the detector and intervening materials. We use two values of c that make
the sample standard deviation of {mijl, i= 1,2, . . . ,N} equal to 0.00025 and
0.00035, respectively, corresponding to roughly a maximum of 0.15% and
0.21% relative change in the pulse height of the 16 DRFs for the two iso-
topes plus background radiation, at each energy level. Data were simulated
with the randomly modulated DRFs and background, but the tests assum-
ing possible carbon shielding and correct source radionuclides are carried
out assuming no DRF or background errors. Each experiment is replicated
6000 times.
Figure 10 plots the empirical power curves for c= 0,0.00025 and 0.00035,
which show that errors in the DRFs and the background radiation inflated
the size of the test, increasingly so with the magnitude of c. The case of c= 0
corresponds to no shielding. The size-inflation problem can be corrected by
finding the cutoff that makes the size of the test equal to the nominal 0.05.
For example, for c = 0.00025, the 0.05 quantile of the test statistic under
the null hypothesis of no shielding, that is, x= 0, is approximately 0.03234,
so the test can be corrected by rejecting the null hypothesis if the p-value
of the LM test is less than 0.03504. Figure 10 shows that the size-correction
procedure works at the expense of reducing the power of the test, with
larger errors resulting in greater loss of power. Nonetheless, for small DFR
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Fig. 10. Empirical power of the LM test for shielding 131I and 239Pu by carbon with
mass thickness x, with data generated with the DRFs modulated by independent additive
integrated random walk errors on the logarithmic scale. Solid line: c= 0, that is, no DRF
or background errors; dashed line: c= 0.00025; dotdash line: c= 0.00025 with the test cor-
rected to make the empirical size equal to the 0.05 nominal size; longdash line: c= 0.00035;
dotted line: c= 0.00035 with the test corrected to make the empirical size equal to the 0.05
nominal size. Each experiment was replicated 6000 times.
and background errors, the corrected test still has good power for detecting
shielding. An important research problem is to modify the proposed methods
to make them powerful and yet robust to errors in the DRFs and background
radiation.
7. Discussion. As noted, the LM test is attractive since only constrained
maximum likelihood estimation is needed. Simulation results suggest that
the LM test for simple shielding by lead is robust and powerful for testing
for simple or composite shielding by four common intervening materials,
even if the shielding materials do not contain lead. This result is practi-
cally significant, as we generally do not know the number and nature of the
intervening materials. The usefulness of this robustness result can be broad-
ened by checking whether or not it continues to hold with other shielding
materials.
The problem of testing for shielding may also be addressed by a model
selection approach using some information criterion, with the selection of
the model with x= 0 corresponding to no shielding. However, this requires
fitting a nonlinear model with positive x, which may result in a difficult
global optimization problem, especially in the case of composite shielding.
Implementing the proposed method in field applications, for example,
cargo screening, requires further work to relax some restrictive assumptions
of the proposed methods. A main problem is that besides attenuating gamma
rays, intervening materials, especially those with low atomic number, such
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as carbon, water and concrete, may cause down scattering of the gamma
spectrum via single or multiple external Compton scattering into the detec-
tor. Mitchell, Sanger and Marlow [(1989), equations (11)–(13)] proposed a
semiparametric model for modeling Compton scattering between a monoen-
ergetic gamma ray and materials outside the detector that enter into the
spectrometer. However, the full specification of the semiparametric model
is specific to the unknown geometry of the configuration encompassing the
source, the detector and the shielding materials. Alternatively, down scat-
tering may be studied by Monte Carlo techniques, for example, in MCNP
and GEANT, but this does not yield a closed-form solution for the test
statistics. Hence, down scattering due to Compton scattering external to
the spectrometer cannot be directly incorporated in our proposed testing
approach. While the impact of Compton scattering into the detector may
be of secondary importance, its omission results in errors in the background
radiation and may reduce the power of the test, as demonstrated in Section 6.
Given the complexity needed for modeling external Compton scattering, it
seems that the problem may be best mitigated by modifying the proposed
methods to make them robust to errors in the background and the DRFs.
While our main concern is to detect special nuclear material (SNM) and
so it is reasonable to consider only a few Pu isotopes and a few U isotopes,
it is imperative to reduce false alarms due to the presence of other isotopes
such as Neptunium (Np) and Americium (Am) that can be weaponized, or
naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) such as granite, litter,
etc. These “nuisance” isotopes and/or NORMs are less likely shielded de-
liberately, the presence of each of which is, hence, characterized by their
unique overall DRF signature. The latter signature DRFs can then be addi-
tively augmented into the Poisson regression model, with their coefficients
treated as nuisance parameters in the tests. The theoretical properties and
practical performance of this approach for adjusting for nuisance radioactive
materials constitute an interesting future research direction.
The proposed methods assume known sources of SNMs which are, how-
ever, generally unknown. One way to deal with this problem is to enumerate
a list of interesting combinations of source SNM, perform the test for each
such combination of source SNMs, and adjust for the multiplicity of tests, for
instance, by the Bonferroni rule or some other schemes [Benjamini (2010)].
Background radiation generally varies over time, so an interesting prob-
lem is to devise a real-time updating scheme for background radiation that
incorporates concurrent covariate information, for example, the vehicle type
that may predict associated background suppression by vehicles in cargo
screening [Lo Presti et al. (2006)], and to study the performance of the
proposed methods using the background updating procedure.
Another future research problem is to detect shielding in primary screen-
ing with very low resolution gamma detectors.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 and constrained maximum likelihood
estimation via the EM algorithm (DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS704SUPP; .pdf).
This supplement contains (i) detailed proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 4.1, and
(ii) an algorithm for constrained maximum likelihood estimation assuming
no shielding.
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